Risk often connotes uncertain diverse sources of initiating events, uncertain likelihood of occurrences, and uncertain adverse consequences.
manmade hazards, especially terrorism, must become high on the agendas of government and the professional community.
Furthermore, the advancement in information technology has markedly increased the interconnectedness and interdependencies of our critical infrastructures and has made them vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The reported past disruptions in our information infrastructure are examples of potentially greater and more extensive threats to the world's communications and commerce and to the transportation, defense, and social well-being of many nations. Our nation's physical infrastructures are at the core of the quality of life that we enjoy; historically, many of them were physically and logically separate systems with little interdependence. This situation is rapidly changing and close relationships among infrastructures can now take many forms. The incredibly rapid advancement in computer and communications technology continues to displace the paper-based way we plan, design, construct, operate, and manage the lifecycles of these infrastructures. This trend has intensified the intra-and interdependencies within and among them (Haimes & Jiang, 2001) .
Understanding and thus identifying the myriad sources of risk of terrorism require a holistic philosophical approach that is not restricted or limited to a single discipline, technology, or perspective.
To achieve this gestalt vision, an encompassing, systemic process is mandated, grounded on basic guiding principles of systems analysis, risk analysis, and Stephen Covey's Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (Haimes, 2001a) . Indeed, risk analysis and systems (engineering) analyses are grounded on similar principles. Formally, they represent two different fields with distinct disciplines (as manifested by their different professional societies). In reality, they reinforce and add synergy to each other and constitute a unified approach to problem solving. Many systems and risk analysts find themselves perplexed about the artificial schism between the two disciplines. They have a common philosophical approach to problem solving on one hand, but they differ in their historical evolution and technical maturity. Both groups aspire to the gestalt holistic philosophy of problem solving. In this approach, methodological frameworks, which build on a plethora of theories, methods, tools, and techniques, constitute the instruments with which problems are studied, assessed, understood, managed, and solved (to the extent possible). (The terms systems engineering and systems analysis, which sometimes have different connotations, are used interchangeably here.) Systems analysis is distinguished by its practical philosophy that advocates holistic cognition and decision making for the ultimate purposes of 1. building understanding of the system's nature, functional behavior, and interaction with its environment; 2. improving the decision-making process (e.g., in planning, design, development, operation, management); and 3. identifying, quantifying, and evaluating risks, uncertainties, and variability within the decision-making process.
Risk analysis is also distinguished by its practical philosophy that advocates holism in assessing and managing risk. (Risk is defined here as a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects [Lowrance, 1976] .) Risk management is commonly distinguished from risk assessment, even though some may use the term risk management to connote the entire process of risk assessment and management. As in systems analysis, this philosophy is grounded on the arts, natural and behavioral sciences, and engineering and is supported by a complement of modeling methodologies, optimization and simulation techniques, data-management procedures, and decision-making approaches. Indeed, the same principles that guide systems analysis also guide risk analysis, with the following specific addition:
In risk assessment, the analyst often attempts to answer the following set of triplet questions (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981 ):
1. What can go wrong?
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2. What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 3. What are the consequences?
Answers to these questions help risk analysts identify, measure, quantify, and evaluate risks and their consequences and impacts. Risk management builds on the risk assessment process by seeking answers to a second set of three questions (Haimes, 1991 (Haimes, , 1998 Note that the last question is a most critical one for any managerial decision making. This is so because unless the negative and positive impacts of current decisions on future options are assessed and evaluated (to the extent possible), these policy decisions cannot be deemed to be optimal in any sense of the word. A holistic risk management can be realized only when these questions are addressed in the broader context of management, where all costs, benefits, risks, and impacts of all viable options and their associated tradeoffs are addressed within the hierarchical organizational structure. An approach that harmonizes risk management with the overall system management must also address the following four sources of failure: (a) hardware, (b) software, (c) organizational, and (d) human. This set of failure sources is intended to be internally comprehensive, that is, comprehensive within the system's own internal environment. (External sources of failures are not discussed here because they are commonly not system dependent.) These four elements are not necessarily independent of each other, however. The distinction between software and hardware is not always straightforward, and separating human and organizational failure often is not an easy task.
From the outset of his Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (Covey, 1989) , Covey stressed the need to understand paradigms-the lenses through which we see the universe. Furthermore, according to Covey, it is not what happens to us that affects our behavior; rather, it is our interpretation of what happens. Because our interpretation of the world we live in determines how we create new and innovative solutions to the problems we face, it is essential that we understand the elemental interrelationships in that world. Thus, both understanding the systemic nature of the universe and defining the specific system that we need to address are imperative requirements for our ability to solve problems.
Just as the shift to Covey's principle-centered paradigm enables the adoption of his seven habits, the shift to holistic thinking enables the success of systems analysis and risk analysis. Indeed, at their core, the three entities-systems analysis, risk analysis, and Covey's seven habits-are unified by their common holistic vision and philosophy of the world and of human and organizational behavior. The guiding principles underpinning Covey's philosophy are represented by the following Seven Habits:
1. Be proactive. 2. Begin with the end in mind. 3. Put first things first. 4. Think win/win. 5. Seek first to understand, then to be understood. 6. Synergize. 7. Sharpen the saw.
Viewed in a problem-solving light, they make an essential contribution to the solution: The first habit frames the problem, the second determines the desired outcome, and the third organizes time and effort toward eventual solution. From this point, Habits 4 through 6 are guiding principles that enable personal growth toward interdependence. They stress communication and understanding in relationships, and teamwork and creativity in the problem-solving process. Thus, they help direct the efforts mobilized in the first three habits. Habit 7 stresses constant Haimes / RISK OF TERRORISM 233 The distinction between software and hardware is not always straightforward, and separating human and organizational failure often is not an easy task.
reevaluation and improvement. This combination of elements is very similar to that necessary for successful systems analysis and risk analysis. Thus, the following is an attempt to relate the seven habits to thinking holistically about systems and to the six questions (discussed earlier) that constitute the risk assessment and management process.
The Complexity of Risk of Terrorism
The subject of terrorism has finally received the attention it deserves since the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, even though numerous studies on terrorism have been commissioned in the past. In their recent RAND report Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) illuminated the future of terrorism and its horror, crime, and militancy. They define Netwars as:
an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals that communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a precise central command.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt also warned, "Americans have the tendency to view modern conflict as being more about technology than organization and doctrine." It is precisely for these and other characteristics of terrorism that identifying the plethora of sources of risk is so vital.
For at least two major reasons, conventional paradigms, models, and metrics developed over the years to assess and manage risk may not be well suited to address risks of terrorism. The first is the asymmetrical characteristics of terrorism, where an individual or a small group can inflict major harm to a large population and/or cause major damage to infrastructures. The second reason relates to the likelihood of a terrorist attack. These two characteristics render dysfunctional the common metric for measuring risk, namely, the expected value of risk.
Remember that risk has been defined as a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects (Lowrance, 1976) . Although one of the most dominant steps in the risk-assessment process is the quantification of risk, the validity of the expected value, and the metric most commonly used to quantify risk has received neither the broad professional scrutiny it deserves nor the hoped-for wider mathematical challenge that it mandates. Consider, for example, the concentration of the contaminant trichloroethylene (TCE) in a groundwater system, measured in parts per billion (ppb). Let pi denote the probability of the contaminant concentration, c i , of the i th sample, and let E[x] denote the expected value of the containment concentration measured in pbb (i.e., the risk of the groundwater being contaminated by an average concentration of TCE), where
Then the expected value of the risk of TCE contamination of the groundwater system is
Note that the expected-value operation commensurates contamination (events) of low concentration and high probability with contamination of high concentration and low probability. For example, events c 1 = 2 ppb and c 2 = 20,000 ppb with the probabilities p 1 = 0.1 and p 2 = 0.00001, respectively, yield the same contribution to the overall expected value of risk of contamination:
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However, to the decision makers in charge, the relatively low likelihood of a disastrous contamination of the groundwater system with 20,000 ppb of TCE cannot be equivalent to contamination at a low concentration of 0.2 ppb, even with a very high likelihood of such contamination. Due to the nature of mathematical smoothing, the averaging function of the contaminant concentration in this example does not lend itself to prudent management decisions. This is because the expected value of risk does not accentuate the catastrophic events and their consequences, thus misrepresenting what would be perceived as unacceptable risk.
Because of the nature of terrorism, using the expected value as the common metric to quantify the risk of terrorism is even more dangerous. The precommensuration of low probability of occurrence, high-damage events with high probability, low-damage events into one expectation function markedly distorts the relative importance of high-consequence events. In particular, the expected value of risk is heavily dependent on probabilities; yet terrorist attacks may not follow any trend or statistical pattern. Furthermore, terrorism defies the central tendency of events, and therefore, relying on probabilities to measure the dire consequences of terrorism is likely to lead to fallacious analysis. Clearly, one single extreme and catastrophic terrorist attack is one too many. Finally, because terrorism is asymmetric, it defies conventional benefit-cost analysis.
The conditional expected value of the risk of extreme events generated by the partitioned multi-objective risk method (PMRM), when used in conjunction with the (unconditional) expected value, can markedly contribute to the total risk-management approach (Asbeck & Haimes, 1984; Haimes, 1998) . A conditional expectation is defined as the expected value of a random variable given that this value lies within some prespecified range. In this case, the decision makers must make tradeoffs not only between the cost of preventing (or managing) the risk of a terrorist attack versus the expected value of the risk itself but also between the cost of preventing (or managing) such risk versus the conditional expected value of risk of an extreme event. Such a process provides decision-makers with more complete, more factual, and less aggregated information about all viable policy options and their associated tradeoffs. The conditional expected value of risk has been widely applied to dam safety, cyber terrorism, the protection of transportation and water infrastructures, and to numerous studies.
The Global Risk of Terrorism: Historical Perspectives
To appreciate the need and importance of a holistic risk assessment and management process in addressing terrorism, it is constructive to characterize it in three, albeit overlapping, categories:
1. Risk to critical cyber-physical infrastructures. 2. Risk to organizational-societal infrastructures. 3. Risk to human lives and to individual property, liberty, and freedom.
The vulnerability of our critical infrastructures has been formally addressed by President Clinton's Executive Order 13010, issued on July 15, 1996. This order established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) to develop a national strategy for protecting the nation's infrastructures from various threats, and to ensure their continued operation (Clinton, 1996) . The order stated, America's critical infrastructures underpin every aspect of our lives. They are the foundations of our prosperity, enablers of our defense, and the vanguard of our future. They empower every element of our society. There is no more urgent priority than assuring the security, continuity, and availability of our critical infrastructures.
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Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD63), issued on May 28, 1998, built on the PCCIP's recommendations, which had been reported in October 1997 (PCCIP, 1997). The report called for a national effort to assure the security of the United States'increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures. PDD63 set up a new institutional structure to deal with this important challenge. In it, President Clinton (1998) declared, It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity and viability of critical infrastructures. I intend that the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber-systems.
The Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission) was released in December 2000. It highlights the dire consequences of cyber-physical terrorism (Gilmore, 2000) :
In a terrorism context, cyber-attacks inside the United States could have "mass disruptive," if not "mass destructive" or "mass casualty" consequences. . . . Moreover, it is conceivable that terrorists could mount a cyber-attack against power or water facilities or industrial plants-for example, a commercial chemical plant that produces a highly toxic substance-to produce casualties in the hundreds or thousands.
In addition, a May 2001 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) makes the following ominous statement about the nation's response to terrorism:
If federal, state, and local agencies fail to coordinate effectively and judiciously, the gravity and nature of mass casualties following a CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear] attack, combined with a lack of confidence in government's ability to respond, could produce civil disorder and damage the fabric of society.
The PCCIP report of October 1997 officially recognized terrorism as an obvious threat to the nation's critical infrastructures and thus to our security and well-being. This ushered in a new era, previously invisible and menaced by possible chaos that has been gaining momentum since the dismantling of the Soviet Union.
Methodological Approach to Risk Assessment and Management
We recall that the triplet questions in the risk assessment process are as follows: What can go wrong? What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? And what are the consequences? The more comprehensive and encompassing are the answers to the first and third questions, the greater the need that critical sources of risk and/or consequences will not be left out of consideration. For example, to capture the plethora of sources of risk to any and all of the three categories of terrorism risk (critical cyber-physical infrastructures, organizational-societal infrastructures, and human lives, liberty, and freedom) requires models of multiple visions and perspectives. These visions must transcend the domains of the arts and sciences, technology, geography, time horizon, culture and anthropology, religions and traditions, and cyber and physical infrastructures, among others. Hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) (Haimes, 1981 (Haimes, , 1998 , which was developed two decades ago, has been deployed to identify myriad sources of risk of terrorism to water systems, cyber infrastructures, and transportation systems, among others.
Indeed, it is impracticable to represent within a single model all the aspects of a truly largescale system, which may be of interest at any given time (to its management, to government regulators, to students, or to any other group). Our inability to treat the most basic attributes of large-scale systems from some relevant vantagepoint with some degree of commonality constitutes a remaining weakness in our theoretic modeling base.
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HHM reflects a difference in kind from previous modeling schemas. The name is suggested by holography-the technique of lensless photography. The difference between holography and conventional photography, which captures only two-dimensional planar scenes, is analogous to the differences we see between conventional mathematical modeling techniques (yielding what might be termed "planar" models) and the HHM schema.
In the abstract, a mathematical model may be viewed as a one-sided image of the real system, which it portrays. With single-model analysis and interpretation, it is quite impossible to clarify and document the sources of risk associated with not only the multiple components, objectives, and constraints of a system but also with its welter of societal aspects (functional, temporal, geographic, economic, political, legal, environmental, sectoral, institutional, etc.) . Given this assumption and the notion that even present integrated models cannot adequately cover a system's aspects per se, the concept of hierarchical holographic modeling constitutes a comprehensive theoretical framework for systems modeling and risk identification.
HHM has the ability to identify hundreds of sources of risks. For example, more than 900 sources of risk to information assurance were identified for the U.S. Army (Lamm & Haimes, 2001) . A study on the vulnerability of the U.S. water supply system to terrorism conducted for the PCCIP discovered close to 100 sources of risk (Haimes, Matalas, Lambert, Jackson, & Fellows, 1998) . Another study on the vulnerability of transportation infrastructures to terrorism identified more than 100 sources of risk (Haimes & Leung, 2001) .
The risk filtering, ranking, and management (RFRM) methodology (Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert, in press ) builds on hierarchical holographic modeling to identify risks. It then filters and ranks the many sources of risks, enabling decision makers to focus on the most critical. The prioritized risks are further evaluated in the risk management phase, which offers options and action strategies. The RFRM method constitutes eight phases:
Phase I: Scenario identification through hierarchical holographic modeling. HHM is employed to identify risks to the system. These stem from many sources, including natural-occurring events, accidents, and willful attacks. Phase II: Scenario filtering. The HHM generates a significant number of risk scenarios. Not all of these are of immediate and concurrent concern to all decision makers. Hence, they are filtered according to the interests and responsibilities of the individual. Phase III: Bi-criteria filtering and ranking. This phase assesses the likelihood and consequences of the remaining risk scenarios. They are mapped in a risk matrix adapted from Military Standard (MIL-STD) 882, U.S. Department of Defense (Roland & Moriarty, 1990) . The likelihood and consequence are combined into a joint concept called severity, used as the filtering criteria. Phase IV: Multi-criteria evaluation. Criteria related to the system's resilience, robustness, and redundancy are identified and risk scenarios are evaluated against them. Phase V: Quantitative ranking. The likelihood of each scenario is quantified. This avoids possible miscommunications when interpreting verbal expressions of likelihood used in Phase III, such as "likely," "seldom," and "unlikely." Phase VI: Risk management. Risk management options are developed and evaluated. Phase VII: Safeguarding against missing critical items. Reducing the large number of risk scenarios to a manageable number may have inadvertently filtered out scenarios that originally seemed minor. Input from all stakeholders is critical in filtering risk scenarios to reduce this possibility. Moreover, emerging critical threats and other sources of risk should not be overlooked. Phase VIII: Operational feedback. This provides for continuous improvement of the methodology. No single methodology is complete and perfect. New methodology could be developed and tools improved on the basis of the feedback accumulated during the process.
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Risk Management through Multi-Objective Tradeoff Analysis
Risk assessment should be an integral part of the multiple-objective modeling effort (as demonstrated through HHM) and risk management should be an imperative part of the multipleobjective decision-making process-not an after-the-fact vacuous exercise. Risk management is defined as the formulation of policies and the development of risk-control options (i.e., measures to prevent, reduce, or accept risk). The obvious and inevitable overlapping of risk assessment and risk management has led many to consider the former as part of the latter. Indeed, to manage risk, explicit tradeoffs must be made among all costs, benefits, and risks. Clearly, it is impractical, if not utterly wrong, to precommensurate the risks of terrorism to human life or to the economy in monetary terms before generating and analyzing the tradeoffs among the risks, costs, and benefits in their respective natural units. In other words, converting these multiple noncommensurate and often conflicting and competing objectives into a single value not only would lead to fallacious results, it would also lose the confidence of the decision makers, the ultimate users of such analyses. Indeed, the multi-objective tradeoff analyses are at the heart of an effective risk management process.
Decision makers must invariably decide on the level of safety of the system under their control (i.e., the level of risk that is deemed acceptable) and the acceptable cost associated with that safety. In determining a preferred policy in a multi-objective framework, where costs, benefits, and risks are traded off, it is not sufficient to provide the decision makers with only the values of the cost, benefit, and risk, at each alternative policy option on the noninferior set (or Pareto-optimal frontier). (A solution to a multi-objective optimization problem is termed noninferior or Pareto optimal if improving one objective function can be achieved only at the expense of degrading another one [Chankong & Haimes, 1983] ). For sound and informative decision making, it is imperative that the decision makers also be provided with the tradeoff values associated with the respective objectives. This is so because the tradeoffs between the cost of risk management (reduction) and the corresponding level of risk reduction are seldom linear. Therefore, any single value (e.g., derived through a utility function and applied uniformly to all policy options) that might attempt to commensurate or equate the number of dollars needed to reduce a certain level of risk is apt to be misrepresentative, erroneous, and misleading.
Epilogue
A systemic, quantitative, and principle-based risk assessment and management process can and has been effective in addressing infrastructure protection and homeland security against terrorism. A critically important element in the risk management process and particularly in the formulation of public policy, is the sixth question, "What are the impacts of current decisions on future options?" Ignoring this question is likely to lead to disastrous unintended consequences. The following is a sample of technological and societal trends that have affected the redundancy, robustness, and resiliency of our cyber-physical and organizational-societal infrastructures as we face an accelerated era of global terrorism:
• Most important, the increased reliance on information technology and information systems has added complexity to the interconnectedness and interdependencies between and among the cyber-physical and organizational-societal infrastructures.
• The reliance on information technology and information systems has also reduced the operational buffer zone in most infrastructures due to an adherence to the "just-in-time" philosophy as a vehicle for cost reduction and efficient operation.
• The ability to communicate across the continents through the Internet and to exchange information rapidly has changed the conduct of business globally and affected our national security and the defense of the Homeland against terrorism.
• Cold war security laws and regulations have been proven ineffective in today's wireless and satellite-based communications.
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• The advances in information technology have not been matched commensurably with the national organizational and institutional infrastructures.
• Understanding (and modeling) the interconnectedness and interdependencies of communications (through the Internet) and other sectors of the economy and infrastructures (through supervisory control and data acquisition [SCADA] systems) is an imperative to information assurance, infrastructure survivability, and minimizing the adverse effects of terrorism.
• The lack of appropriate knowledge management is well articulated in the Addendum on Structure and Process Analysis to the Road Map for National Security, published by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (2001) headed by Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman:
However, the rapid proliferation of information and communications technology by individual departments and agencies has resulted in a wide range of different capabilities that are not always interoperable. In fact, rather than speed information flow, incompatible technical capabilities can restrict it. What is clear is that the U.S government lacks integrated information architecture at the interagency level.
• Our paradigms, models, metrics, and assumptions must be reevaluated and "reengineered" to adapt to the new era of global terrorism. For example, traditional costbenefit analysis or the reliance on multi-attribute utility theory cannot provide answers to the risk assessment and management processes in addressing terrorist attacks and the netwar phenomenon. No longer can we be concerned primarily with the costs of property losses. Rather, lives, democracy, and the fabric of our free society are at stake, and no utility function(s) can adequately represent the associated tradeoffs in monetary terms.
